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[6] Material constraints: e.g., Shultziner et al.2010: 327.Leveling needed to combat natural hierarchies: Boehm 1999: 37, 39.Enforcement: Boehm 1999: 43–89; also, more briefly,Shultziner et al.2010: 325–327; Kelly 2013: 243–244; Boix 2015: 46–51; Morris 2015: 33–43.
[7] Marlowe 2010: 225–254, esp.232–234, 237–238, 240–241, 248, 251–254.Typical character(on the Hadza as “median foragers”): 255–283.The !Kung bushmen are another wellknown and much-cited case: Lee 1979; 1984.
[8] Growth and surplus: Boix 2015: 54–55 for the point about heterogeneous outcomes.Low inequality: Smith et al.2010b, and see herein, pp.37–39.
[9] Outside contacts: Sassaman 2004: 229, 236–238.Not “living fossils”: Marlowe 2010: 285–286; and Kelly 2013: 269–275 on hunter-gatherers as a proxy for prehistory, a complex yet useful analogy.
[01] 1英里=1609.344米。——编者注
[10] Trinkaus, Buzhilova, Mednikova, and Dobrovolskaya 2014 is now the authoritative treatment of the Sungir finds: see esp.3–33 on the site, date, and mortuary behavior and 272–274, 282–283, 287–288 on the injuries and disorders.Bead size: Formicola 2007: 446.Inherited status: Anghelinu 2012: 38.
[11] Vanhaeren and d’Errico 2005; Pettitt, Richards, Maggi and Formicola 2003; d’Errico and Vanhaeren 2016: 54–55.
[12] See esp.Shultziner et al.2010: 333–334; Anghelinu 2012: 37–38; Wengrow and Graeber 2015.Marean 2014讨论了适应沿海生活的悠久历史和重要性。
[13] 关于西海岸的一般情况，现在可以简单参考Boix 2015: 98–101; Morris 2015: 37。实际上，因果关系可能更为复杂：e.g., Sassaman 2004: 240–243, 264–265.Kelly 2013: 252–266,esp.251 fig.9.3, offers a general model.Aquatic foragers: Johnson and Earle 2000: 204–217,esp.211–216。
[14] Prentiss et al.2007; Speller, Yang, and Hayden 2005: 1387 (Keatley Creek); Prentiss et al.2012,esp.321 (Bridge River).
[15] Flannery and Marcus 2012: 67–71 (Chumash).Complexity: Kelly 2013: 241–268, esp.242 table 9.
[16] Chronology of domestication: Price and Bar-Yosef 2011: S171 table 1.关于农业起源的问题，特别要参考Barker 2006和Current Anthropology专刊的一些文章52, S4 (2011),S161–S512。Diamond 1997依然是关于驯化的范围和步骤的全球变化的最简单直接分析。Nonlinearity: Finlayson and Warren 2010.
[17] Natufians: Barker 2006: 126; Price and Bar-Yosef 2010: 149–152; Pringle 2014: 823; and cf.also Bowles and Choi 2013: 8833–8834; Bowles 2015: 3–5.
[18] Impact of Younger Dryas: Mithen 2003: 50; Shultziner et al.2010: 335.Pre-Pottery Neolithic: Price and Bar-Yosef 2010: 152–158.
[19] Rivaya-Martínez 2012: 49 (Comanche); Haas 1993, esp.308–309 tables 1–2 (North American societies).
[20] Borgerhoff Mulder et al.2009: 683 fig.1 (sample), 684 table 1 (43 wealth measures for these societies), S34 table S4 (inequality for different wealth types), 685 table 2, S35 table S5 (Ginis).在多米尼加受到限制的种植者中，较高的土地不平等程度提高了他们相对于觅食者的生存模式下的平均物质不平等程度，这就意味着这两个群体可能要比这个小样本所显示的更为一致。关于种植者的数据，参见Gurven et al.2010。
[21] Borgerhof f Mulder et al.2009: 686, with S37 table S7; Smith et al.2010a: 89 fig.3.
[22] Model: Borgerhof f Mulder et al.2009: 682.Correlation: Smith et al.2010a: 91 fig.5.Shennan 2011对于无形财富到物质财富资源的转移，以及它创造不平等的潜力给予很大的权重。
[23] Smith et al.2010a: 92 (defensibility); Boix 2015: 38 table 1.1.B (global survey); Bowles and Choi 2013 (property rights).后者开发出一个正式模型，其中，气候的改善使得种植业变得更有生产力和可被预测，并且导致了农业的扩张和私有产权的出现。
[24] Wright 2014.
[25] Mesopotamia: Flannery and Marcus 2012: 261–282, esp.264–266, 268, 272, 274, 281.也参考对于埃兰（胡泽斯坦）一个有着超过1000个墓葬的墓地的分析，其中包括从富有铜制品和精美彩陶的墓葬到仅有烹煮锅罐的贫穷墓葬，也可以参见Price and Bar-Yosef 2010: 159对于幼发拉底河岸边哈陆拉村落遗址中100多个墓葬中不平等状况的研究。
[02] 1磅=0.4536公斤。——编者注
[26] Biehl and Marciniak 2000, esp.186, 189–191; Higham et al.2007, esp.639–641, 643–647,649; Windler, Thiele, and Müller 2013, esp.207 table 2 (also on another site in the area).
[27] Johnson and Earle 2000对社会进化提供了一个精彩的分析。关于典型的群体规模，参见246页表8。
[28] Global sample: Boix 2015: 38 table 1.1.C.North America: Haas 1993: 310 table 3.SCCS: Boix 2015: 103 table 3.1.D.
[29] Cereals: Mayshar, Moav, Neeman, and Pascali 2015, esp.43–45, 47.Agriculture and state formation: Boix 2015: 119–121, esp.120 fig.3.3.参考Petersen and Skaaning 2010对于在地理和气候特征影响下的驯化导致的国家形成上的时间差别的分析，这也支撑了Diamond 1997的研究。同样可以参考Haber 2012对于谷物储存在国家形成的后期阶段作用的分析。
[30] Quote: Haas 1993: 312.Scheidel 2013: 5–9 presents and discusses various definitions of the state, several of which contribute to the summary given in the text.For the nature of premodern states, see herein, pp.46–48.Maisels 1990: 199–220, Sanderson 1999: 53–95, and Scheidel 2013: 9–14 offer surveys of modern theories of state formation.
[31] Circumscription theory: Carneiro 1970; 1988.For simulation models of state formation driven by warfare, see Turchin and Gavrilets 2009; Turchin, Currie, Turner, and Gavrilets 2013.Boix 2015: 127–170, 252–253 also stresses the role of warfare.
[32] Decentralized polities: e.g., Ehrenreich, Crumley, and Levy 1995; Blanton 1998.Quote:Cohen 1978: 70; see also Trigger 2003: 668–670 for pervasive hierarchization.Values:Morris 2015: 71–92, esp.73–75, 92.
[33] Estimates: Scheidel 2013, conjectured from McEvedy and Jones 1978 and Cohen 1995: 400.On the nature of the early state, see herein.For the structure and world history of empires,see esp.Doyle 1986; Eisenstadt 1993; Motyl 2001; Burbank and Cooper 2010; Leitner 2011;Bang, Bayly, and Scheidel forthcoming; and the précis in Scheidel 2013: 27–30.For citystates, see esp.Hansen 2000 and, very briefly, Scheidel 2013: 30–32.
[03] 1平方英里≈2589988.11平方米。——编者注
[34] For the evolution of steppe empires—which are absent from the present study mainly for want of relevant data—see Barfield 1989; Cioffi-Revilla, Rogers, Wilcox, and Alterman 2011; http://nomadicempires.modhist.ox.ac.uk/.Cf.also Turchin 2009 for their role in large-scale state formation.Growing size: Taagepera 1978: 120.
[35] Fig.1.1 from Gellner 1983: 9 fig.1 as reproduced in Morris 2015: 66 fig.3.6.
[36] On the nature of premodern states in general, see esp.Claessen and Skalník 1978b; Gellner 1983: 8–18; Tlly 1985; Giddens 1987: 35–80; Kautsky 1982, esp.341–348; Haldon 1993;Sanderson 1999: 99–133; Crone 2003: 35–80 (quote: 51); North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009: 30–109 and across-disciplinary meta-survey in Scheidel 2013: 16–26.
[37] Makers and takers: Balch 2014.Babylonia: Jursa 2015 and personal communication.嫁妆实际价值的中位数和均值分别高出70%和130%，同时这两个时期的基尼系数是0.43（n = 82）和0.55（n = 84），或者最高的异常值被从每一个数据集剔除之后分别是0.41和0.49。关于新巴伦的经济动态，参见Jursa 2010。
[38] For regressive distribution in despotic regimes, see, e.g., Trigger 2003: 389 and Boix 2015:259.Winters 2011追溯了历史进程中的寡头权力，主要聚焦在财富的保护上（特别是20~26页）。互惠的观念主要存在于概念领域。Claessen and Skalník 1978a: 640优美地定义道：“早期国家是一种中央集权的社会–政治组织，其目的是在一个——至少被分成了两个基本社会阶层或新兴的社会阶级（统治者和被统治者），这两者关系的特征是前者的政治主导性和后者的进贡义务并存的——复杂、分层社会中对社会关系进行规制，那种互惠性是基本原则的共同意识形态使其合法化了。
[39] For Mamluk Egypt, see herein, p.82; for the Roman Republic, herein, pp.71–74 and chapter 6, p.187.
[40] Entrepreneurs: Villette and Vullermot 2009.For the Roman Republic, see herein, p.73; for France, pp.83–84.我参考个人化的政治喜好，是为了把这些因素与减税的作用区分开。在美国和其他盎格鲁–撒克逊国家中，最高收入群体所占比例有所上升，这些人整体上受益于富人。
[41] For the role of returns on capital and of shocks on these returns, see esp.the concise expositions in Piketty and Saez 2014: 841–842; Piketty 2015b: 73–78, and more generally Piketty 2014: 164–208.For the debate, see herein, chapter 15, pp.411–423.
[42] Hudson 1996b: 34–35, 46–49; 1996c: 299, 303; Trigger 2003: 316–321, 333; Flannery and Marcus 2012: 500–501, 515–516.苏美尔人的经验在这里占有一席之地，因为它代表了这些过程最早的得以保存下来的例子。
[43] Hudson 1996a: 12–13, 16; Flannery and Marcus 2012: 474–502, esp.489–491 on Lagash.For debt relief, see herein, chapter 12, pp.359–360.
[44] Ebla: Hoffner 1998: 65–80, esp.73–77.Quotes: 75 paragraphs 46, 48.The Hurrians were located in northern Mesopotamia, the Hittites in Anatolia.
[04] 1英亩≈4046.86平方米。——编者注
[45] Foster 2016: 40, 43, 56, 62, 72, 90, 92; also Hudson 1996c: 300.Quotes: Foster 2016: 8(Rimush), 13 (Naram-Sin), 40 (scribes), 43 (elite).For the collapse of the Akkadian empire,see herein, chapter 9, p.280.在后续的帝国形成过程中，首都的精英和政府官员获得了不成比例的利益：例如Yoffee 1988: 49–52。
[46] Trigger 2003: 375–394 surveys these features across several early civilizations.For the Oyo,see 393.The contributions in Yun-Casalilla and O’Brien 2012 and Monson and Scheidel 2015 add up to a broad overview of fiscal regimes in world history.
[47] 第一段引用来自所谓的巴比伦神义论，这是一个用中巴比伦语言写成的文本：Oshima 2014: 167, line 282，第二段来自Trigger 2003: 150–151。
[48] Quote: Fitzgerald 1926.For stature inequality, see Boix and Rosenbluth 2014: 11–14,reprised in Boix 2015: 188–194; and see also Payne 2016: 519–520.Scheidel 2009b surveys reproductive inequality across world history.
[49] See herein, p.48 (Babylonians), pp.76–77, and chapter 9, pp.267–269 (housing).
[50] See herein, appendix, pp.447–449 (distributions), chapter 6, pp.188–199 (Greeks), chapter 3,p.108 (America).洛伦茨曲线是用来描述给定人口中资产分布状况的图。少数成员的高度集中会引起曲线右端的急剧上升。
[51] Oded 1979: 19, 21–22, 28, 35, 60, 78–79, 81–91, 112–113.See also herein, chapter 6, p.200.
[52] Regarding slavery, see esp.Patterson 1982: 105–171 on the different modes of creating and acquiring slaves, Miller 2012 for slavery in global history, and Zeuske 2013 for the global history of slavery.For Rome, see Scheidel 2005a; for Sokoto, Lovejoy 2011; and for the United States, herein, p.108.